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8. Persecution, politics and protection 
in the United States: finding refuge from 
organised crime in the Americas 
Sarnata Reynolds
Maria reached the United States border with her daughter in March 2014. Her husband and son had already fled Michoacán, Mexico and had received asylum protection in the US. When Maria told 
a border guard she had fled her home because her brother had been killed by 
a cartel and her family continued to be threatened by them, she was detained 
for two months. Ultimately, she and her daughter were deported after an 
immigration judge found her experience not credible. I met Maria in Tijuana, 
at the border between the US and Mexico in June 2014. She could not return 
to Michoacán safely and she could not join her family in the US, so she was 
living in a women’s shelter and didn’t know what would happen next.1 Her 
story is not an anomaly, and her experience of violence, displacement and an 
inability to secure protection are mirrored in the stories of tens of thousands of 
other Mexicans and Central Americans seeking refuge from violence meted out 
by organised criminal groups. 
More than 60,000 unaccompanied children arrived at the US border in 
2014, double the number of arrivals in 2013.2 Although numbers were down 
as 2015 unfolded, 18,000 unaccompanied children had already arrived at the 
US border at the time of writing (mid 2015).3 The previous year had been 
the first in which Mexican children had not constituted the majority of 
arrivals, but because they are summarily turned around at the border, little 
has ever been known about their decision to undertake the journey alone, 
or the circumstances under which they travel.4 Children from Guatemala, 
1 S. Reynolds, ‘Mexico’s hidden victims’, Refugees International, 2 July 2014 [hereinafter 
Reynolds, ‘Mexico’].
2 US Customs and Border Patrol, Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children (2015), 
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children (accessed 15 
March 2016). 
3 Ibid.
4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Office for the United States and 
the Caribbean (UNHCR), ‘Children on the run: unaccompanied children leaving Central 
America and Mexico and the need for international protection’, 14 March 2014, p. 5. See 
S. Reynolds, ‘Persecution, politics and protection in the United States: finding refuge from 
organised crime in the Americas’, in D.J. Cantor and N. Rodríguez Serna (eds.), The New Refugees: 
Crime and Forced Displacement in Latin America (University of London, 2016), pp. 129–46
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El Salvador and Honduras (hereinafter ‘the Northern Triangle’) are detained 
upon arrival, as required by US law, so the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have been able to interview many young people and publish analyses 
of the underlying circumstances that pushed them along this route.5 
As well as children, increasing numbers of adults from Mexico and the 
Northern Triangle are filing for protection in the US.6 For example, Mexican 
asylum requests before the immigration courts almost quadrupled between 
2009 and 2013, and Salvadoran applications doubled.7 At the same time, 
citizens of the Northern Triangle countries are filing asylum applications in 
Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Belize. These latter countries have 
documented a 435 per cent increase in the number of asylum applications.8 
Much of the flight taking place is in direct response to the absence of security 
in Mexico and the Northern Triangle, where murder, forced recruitment, 
kidnapping, extortion and other forms of violence by organised crime, gangs 
and other armed actors occur with almost complete impunity.9 And yet, 
applications for protection are being routinely denied by asylum officers, the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the federal Circuit Courts across 
the United States. The US is by far the greatest recipient of asylum-seekers 
from the Northern Triangle and for this reason how the US adjudicates asylum 
cases from the Northern Triangle takes on great importance. The next section 
reviews US asylum law and the treatment of gang-based persecution claims in 
the courts. 
International protection, non-State actors and new 
forms of displacement
Of course the violence and persecution that many experience in Mexico and 
Central America was not foreseen when the 1951 Convention relating to the 
also UNHCR, ‘Arrancados de Raiz’, Aug. 2014; N. Pizzey, J. Frederick and Washington 
Office on Latin America (WOLA), ‘Forgotten on “La Frontera”: Mexican children fleeing 
violence are rarely heard’, 22 Jan. 2015. 
5 Ibid. See also E. Kennedy, ‘No childhood here: why Central American children are fleeing 
their homes’, Immigration Policy Center: American Immigration Council, 1 July 2014. 
6 ‘US Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of Planning, 
Analysis and Technology, Immigration Courts: Asylum Statistics, FY 2009–2013’, April 
2014. 
7 Ibid.
8 UNHCR, ‘Children on the run’, p. 15.
9 S. Reynolds, ‘“It’s a suicide act to leave or stay”: internal displacement in El Salvador’, 
Refugees International, 29 July 2015 [hereinafter Reynolds, ‘El Salvador’]. See also D.J. 
Cantor, ‘The new wave: forced displacement caused by organised crime in Central America 
and Mexico’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33 (2014), 34–68 [hereinafter Cantor, ‘New wave’]. 
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Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) was developed. This creates challenges 
to pursuing protection through the Convention’s framework, but it should 
not lead to the easy inference that the Refugee Convention and US asylum 
law do not apply. In fact, over the last 60 years the international community’s 
understanding of almost every element of the Convention’s framework has 
evolved, with individuals, nations, advocates and academics having identified 
preexisting and emerging persecution patterns, either overlooked originally or 
having emerged since.10
At the time of its creation the Refugee Convention reflected the experience 
of those who had recently survived genocide and other mass atrocities and 
crimes against humanity. Although it is an enlightened document, its 
limitations are perhaps most readily revealed by the fact that the rape of women 
was not originally considered to be an individual experience of persecution, 
but was instead viewed as a crime against ‘honour’, or a proxy crime against 
the men of a family or community.11 It wasn’t until 1993 that the international 
community formally acknowledged rape as a crime against humanity,12 and it 
wasn’t until 1995 that US asylum law explicitly recognised rape as an act of 
persecution by issuing ‘Gender Guidelines’.13 
To some, a request for protection based on persecution by organised 
criminal groups or other armed actors may seem far-fetched, and this 
assumption is certainly reflected in much of the case law. But in reality, a lot 
of the violence perpetrated against individuals and families in Mexico and the 
Northern Triangle is organised, purposeful and motivated by their particular 
characteristics.14 For example, in July 2015, the 18th Street gang in El Salvador 
ordered all bus drivers to go on strike or risk being killed. This action was taken 
to exert pressure on the El Salvador government to negotiate with the gang. 
Five bus drivers who ignored the ultimatum were killed on the first day of the 
forced strike, and two weeks into it, nine drivers had been killed. Although a 
non-State actor, the 18th Street gang (Barrio-18) had targeted for persecution 
a distinct group of workers and the government could not protect these 
people from being victimised, although it did try.15 The decision to resist their 
10 W.T. Worster, ‘The evolving definition of the refugee in contemporary international law’, 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, 30 (2012), 94–160.
11 S. Reynolds, ‘Deterring and preventing rape and sexual slavery during periods of armed 
conflict’, Journal of Law and Inequality, 16 (1998), 601−5.
12 Ibid. 
13 P. Coven, ‘Considerations for asylum officers adjudicating asylum claims from women’, 
United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 26 May 1995, p. 9.
14 See, e.g., Reynolds, ‘Mexico’; Reynolds, ‘El Salvador’; Cantor, ‘New wave’; N. Rodríguez 
Serna, ‘Fleeing cartels and maras: international protection considerations and profiles from 
the Northern Triangle’, International Journal of Refugee Law (forthcoming 2016).
15 E. Izadi, ‘Driving a bus is a “death sentence” in El Salvador’s capital city’, Washington Post, 
31 July 2015.
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demands should be properly viewed as a political opinion, and this population 
of drivers would also be a distinct social group within society. Adjudicators 
must look beyond the surface, fairly apply the elements of refugee law, and 
extend protection to those individuals who demonstrate a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of a protected ground.16 
Emergence of ‘gang-based’ persecution claims in the 
United States
In the US, practitioners, advocates and the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (which houses the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) refer to asylum claims based upon a fear of persecution by 
organised criminal groups and gangs as ‘gang-based asylum’ claims. This chapter 
will therefore adopt the term ‘gang-based asylum’ as a shorthand reference. Its 
usage, however, should not be construed as meaning that various groups act in 
similar ways, target the same types of individuals, or are motivated by the same 
set of considerations. 
Indeed, individuals in Mexico, the Northern Triangle and other parts of 
the world may be targeted by transnational or national criminal organisations, 
state or locally-based gang operations, or a combination of them. This could 
be because of their age, gender or social status; actual or perceived access to 
wealth; or opposition to gangs in their communities or states for political or 
religious reasons. Or they could be targeted due to a combination of these 
factors or for an entirely different set of reasons. It is this dynamism that 
requires an individual analysis of each gang-based persecution case brought 
before an administrative body.17 
Framework for US protection claims
The heart of US asylum law is the protection of refugees fleeing persecution. To 
be fairly administered, it is recognised that access to both administrative and 
independent judicial review is critical as ‘administrative decisions can mean 
the difference between freedom and oppression and, quite possibly, life and 
16 Indeed, in 1991, a class action lawsuit representing over 500,000 asylum-seekers from 
Guatemala and El Salvador was successfully brought against the Department of Justice. 
The case asserted that US asylum adjudication processes were biased against their claims 
and favoured decisions based on foreign policy and border security, which undermined the 
standards of the US Refugee Act of 1980. A ‘protected ground’ refers to the five grounds 
recognised in the Refugee Convention as a basis for protection via refugee status, i.e. race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
17 Although the vast majority of gang-based asylum claims in the US arise out of Mexico and 
the Northern Triangle, they are not the only locations. For example, applications from 
Jamaica, Albania and the Russian Federation have also been made. Indeed, the author once 
successfully represented an Italian man who had fled mob persecution in Italy. 
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death.’18 Administrative review occurs through the immigration courts and 
the BIA. Judicial review occurs through the 13 Federal Circuit Courts, also 
referred to as the Federal Courts of Appeal. The Circuit Courts will defer to 
the BIA’s interpretations of statutory law unless they find them unreasonable, 
and a Circuit Court may put forth a new legal standard, but it will only apply 
to the circuit in the court’s catchment area. 
Making an application for asylum protection 
An applicant may apply for asylum if he or she is ‘physically present in the 
United States’ or at the border. A person who is in the US, whether with or 
without permission, may apply ‘affirmatively’ for protection and will not 
necessarily be detained pending the adjudication of their claim. A person who 
requests protection at a port of entry, or who is apprehended inside the US and 
placed in removal proceedings is subject to detention, and may remain there 
pending defensive asylum proceedings unless an immigration judge issues a 
bond that the person can afford.19 
Pursuant to US law, the Attorney General may grant asylum to any applicant 
who qualifies as a refugee. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines 
a refugee as: 
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the 
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such 
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.20
In enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, one of Congress’s ‘primary purposes was 
to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.’21 When interpreting the 
definition of refugee, the courts are supposed to be guided by the analysis set 
forth in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.22 
18 Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 432 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J. concurring). 
19 J.A. Cabot, ‘Problems faced by Mexican asylum seekers in the United States’, Journal on 
Migration and Human Security, 2 (2014), 363−4. 
20 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 428 (1987) (quoting 8 USC. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); see 
also: 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13.
21 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US pp. 436−7. 
22 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’, 1992; see also: INS 
v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US 415, 427 (1999) (recognising the UNHCR Handbook as ’a 
useful interpretative aid’ that is ‘not binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or United 
States courts’); Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 949 (9th Cir. 2007) (‘We view the 
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Given the legal and geographical discrepancies in asylum adjudication 
among the BIA and Circuit Courts, the likelihood of achieving protection 
is necessarily related to the place where a person applies. The location of 
application, however, is not necessarily a decision made by the applicant. 
The vast majority of asylum-seekers in the US are detained at some point 
during their application process,23 and where they file for asylum is likely 
determined by the state in which they are detained. This is a decision made 
by the immigration enforcement officer at the time of apprehension, and it is 
based primarily on the availability of bed space on any given day. The Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits sit alongside the border and include California, Arizona and 
Texas.24 The vast majority of immigrant apprehensions occur in these states, 
and they host the majority of detention spaces. They are also places in which 
the two Circuit Courts have taken entirely different approaches to gang-based 
persecution claims. 
Persecution
The term ‘persecution’ is not defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
but ‘case law characterizes persecution as an extreme concept, marked by the 
infliction of suffering or harm … in a way regarded as offensive.’25 United 
States courts have found that physical violence, serious threats of violence and 
the cumulative effects of harm can all rise to the level of persecution, pursuant 
to an individual analysis.26 Furthermore, past decisions have confirmed that 
‘age can be a critical factor in the adjudication of asylum claims and may bear 
heavily on the question of whether an applicant was persecuted or whether [he 
UNHCR Handbook as persuasive authority in interpreting the scope of refugee status under 
domestic asylum law.’ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
23 ‘Detention of asylum seekers: seeking protection, finding prison’, Human Rights First (April 
2009), pp. 1−3.
24 New Mexico, also a border state, is inside the 10th Circuit, but due to its harsh 
environment, neither receives as many refugees and migrants, nor hosts as many detention 
beds. 
25 Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). See also Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I & N Dec. 433 (BIA 1983).
26 Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 2006) (Peruvian national who 
received anonymous death threats 15 years ago demonstrated an at least one-in-ten chance 
of future persecution sufficient to establish a well-founded fear); Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 
1155, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2002) (Guatemalan who faced multiple death threats at home and 
business, ‘closely confronted’ and actively chased); Gonzales-Neyra v. INS, 122 F.3d 1293, 
1295-96 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that threats to life and business based on opposition to 
Shining Path constituted past persecution), as amended by 133 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1996) (Nicaraguan threatened with death by 
Sandinistas, house marked, ration card appropriated, and family harassed).
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or] she holds a well-founded fear of future persecution,’27 an important point 
given the number of young people, and particularly unaccompanied children, 
applying for asylum from Mexico and the Northern Triangle.
Substantial economic deprivation that constitutes a threat to life or freedom 
can rise to the level of persecution − the absolute inability to support one’s 
family is not required.28 Extortion is practised on tens of thousands, if not 
more, individuals and families in Mexico and El Salvador, and as long as they 
pay up, they often suffer no further harm. But for those families who resist 
extortion, or cannot pay the required amount, the likelihood of persecution 
increases dramatically. I met many families in Mexico and El Salvador who 
could not afford to continue paying the amount requested by a cartel or gang. 
In a very short time these families received direct death threats, and some were 
murdered or badly beaten before fleeing their homes. 
Based on my own experience representing individuals and families fleeing 
gang-based persecution, as well as a review of the case law over the last eight years, 
applicants who have suffered multiple beatings themselves, or are the siblings, 
parents or children of individuals murdered or kidnapped by organised crime 
or other armed actors will usually have met the criteria for being considered 
to have suffered persecution, as long as they are deemed credible.29 However, 
cases in which an individual or family have fled direct threats and/or suffered 
extortion, but have not yet suffered physical harm, are not as likely to be able 
to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.30 This conclusion should be 
27 Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). ‘[A] child’s reaction to injuries to his family is different from an 
adult’s. The child is part of the family, the wound to the family is personal, the trauma apt 
to be lasting.’ (Joining the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in affirming legal rule that 
injuries to a family must be considered in an asylum case where events that form the basis of 
the past persecution claim were perceived when petitioner was a child). See also Mendoza-
Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1312-15 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognising that even an infant 
can be the victim of persecution even if he or she does not currently recall the events).
28 Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (severe harassment, threats, 
violence and discrimination made it virtually impossible for Israeli Arab to earn a living). 
Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1996) (threats by Sandinistas, violence against 
family, and seizure of family land, ration card, and ability to buy business inventory); 
Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727-29 (9th Cir. 1988) (considering impact of extortion by 
government security forces on Haitian fisherman’s ability to earn livelihood); Samimi v. INS, 
714 F.2d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1983) (seizure of land and livelihood could contribute to a 
finding of persecution). 
29 US asylum law directs that a person who has suffered past persecution at the hands of a 
particular actor benefits from the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. See 
8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1). If the past persecution suffered is severe enough, a person may be 
permitted ‘humanitarian’ asylum even if a well-founded fear of persecution may not exist. 8 
C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1)(iii)((A)-(B).
30 Martinez-Beltrand v. Attorney General, 536 F. App’x 243, 245 (3rd Cir. 2013) (upholding a 
denial of asylum because of the ‘harassment’ suffered, through multiple encounters with a 
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strongly challenged. The receipt of direct death threats by cartels and gangs are 
not received as warnings. They are the predecessors to violence if an individual 
or family does not abide by the conditions placed on them by a gang or cartel. 
Death threats cause immediate and long-lasting trauma because they result in 
murders and further disrupt and displace families.
Source of persecution
While persecution by the State is commonly the basis upon which a person’s 
fear originates in asylum claims, this is often not the case for gang-based 
asylum claims, but should it be the case that a non-State actor is the perpetrator 
the claim should not be undermined by this. In 2005, the then Attorney 
General John Ashcroft issued a decision stating, ‘It is well established that non-
governmental actors, such as terrorists, insurgents, guerrilla organizations, or 
other militant opposition groups, can be guilty of “persecution”’.31 
While in cases of non-State persecution, the court should ‘consider whether 
an applicant reported the incidents to police’, affirmative State action is not 
necessary to establish a well-founded fear of persecution if the government is 
unable or unwilling to control the agents of persecution. 32 This is a particularly 
important consideration in cases arising out of Mexico and the Northern 
Triangle. The infiltration of local and national police and military units is 
extensive and widely known in all of these countries, and I have documented 
many cases in which victims of violence were further persecuted because they 
reported their experience to the police or military.33 In Mexico, collusion 
between cartels and police was exposed internationally in 2014, when the 
police caused 43 students to disappear, who were then murdered by a gang on 
the order of a local mayor in Guerrero state.34
Alongside the corruption of many government actors at all levels, the 
level of impunity is exceptionally high in Mexico and the Northern Triangle 
– over 90 per cent in each country – and should also support a decision to 
forego reporting persecution to a local or national government before flight. 
‘A government’s inability or unwillingness to control violence by private 
gang at her family’s business, requests for money and that she join their gang did not rise to 
the level of persecution). See also Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157, 164 (3rd Cir. 2005)  
(‘U]nfulfilled threats must be of a highly imminent and menacing nature in order to 
constitute persecution.’). 
31 Matter of A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 783-784 (AG 2005).
32 Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 
409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (failure to report non-governmental persecution due to 
belief that police would do nothing did not establish that the government was unwilling or 
unable to control agent of persecution). 
33 See Reynolds, ‘Mexico’ and ‘El Salvador’. 
34 R.C. Archibold, ‘Mexico officially declares missing students dead’, New York Times, 27 Jan. 
2015.
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parties can be established in other ways – for example, by demonstrating that a 
country’s laws or customs effectively deprive the petitioner of any meaningful 
recourse to governmental protection.’35 The fact that economic capacity may 
account for the State’s inability to stop the persecution is not relevant.36  
These directives are clear and so the presence of a non-State actor may not 
be the primary stumbling block in many cases, and yet there are multiple 
examples of courts denying asylum claims because the persecution suffered is 
construed as generalised violence, rather than targeted persecution, something 
that the government cannot be reasonably expected to overcome completely.37 
Within Latin America, forced displacement by non-State actors was 
recognised as such a serious concern to the region that the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration was adopted. This agreement defined ‘refugee’ as more inclusively 
acknowledging people whose freedom and security had been threatened by 
internal conflict, generalised violence and mass violations of human rights 
resulting in public order being disturbed.38 Last December, the Cartagena 
Declaration was revisited at a meeting of regional governments in Brazil. It 
recognised flight caused by violence imposed by organised criminal groups as 
being within the refugee framework, and neighbouring states had an obligation 
to extend protection to those in need of it.39 
Nexus: ‘On account of ’
For asylum applications filed on or after 11 May 11 2005, the REAL ID Act of 
2005 created a new nexus standard, requiring that an applicant establish that 
‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.’40 
The persecutor’s motivation may be established by direct or circumstantial 
evidence: 
 [A] motive is a ‘central reason’ if the persecutor would not have harmed the 
applicant if such motive did not exist. Likewise, a motive is a ‘central reason’ 
if that motive, standing alone, would have led the persecutor to harm the 
35 Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2010). 
36 See Avetovo-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1196-1198 (9th Cir. 2000). 
37 Mendez-Barrera, 602 F.3d at 25 (widespread violence, affecting all citizens, does not establish 
persecution on a protected ground); Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(‘widespread lawlessness’); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 494 (‘[O]rdinary criminal activity does not 
rise to the level of persecution necessary to establish eligibility for asylum’); Ulloa Santos, 552 
F. App’x. at 201 (‘[A]cts by criminals are not persecution’) (internal quotations omitted); 
Perez-Perez v. Holder, 500 F. App’x. 684 (9th Cir. 2012) (MS 13 gang ‘bothers everybody’, 
not just or primarily Christians).
38 UNHCR, ‘Cartagena Declaration on Refugees’, 22 Nov. 1984. 
39 ACNUR, ‘Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action’, www.acnur.org/cartagena30/en/brazil-
declaration-and-plan-of-action/ (accessed 15 March 2016).
40 8 USC. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
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applicant … [P]ersecution may be caused by more than one central reason, 
and an asylum applicant need not prove which reason was dominant. 
Nevertheless, to demonstrate that a protected ground was ‘at least one 
central reason’ for persecution, an applicant must prove that such ground 
was a cause of the persecutors’ acts.41 
Importantly, for gang-based persecution claims ‘proof of particularized 
persecution is not required to establish past persecution.’42 Although 
widespread civil unrest does not, on its own, establish asylum eligibility, the 
existence of general civil strife does not preclude relief.43 This point is sometimes 
overlooked in asylum cases arising out of Mexico and the Northern Triangle, 
as immigration judges and circuit courts have found that the presence of high 
levels of violence in a country demonstrates that the persecution suffered is 
not based on an individual’s specific characteristics but rather his presence in 
a country wracked with crime. This is not an appropriate approach to these 
types of cases, and past case law has established that ‘in certain contexts … 
the existence of civil strife supports a finding that claimed persecution was on 
account of a protected ground’.44 
While the underlying facts may be similar in individual cases, gang-based 
asylum claims are legally positioned in different ways, and that often depends 
on whether counsel is available and how experienced it is at putting forth a 
strong asylum claim. While some applicants claim they were persecuted on 
account of their actual or imputed political opinion or religion, the vast 
majority of gang-based asylum claims in the US are argued through the lens of 
membership in a particular social group. The next section will consider some of 
the specific challenges associated with each of these approaches.
41 Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 
F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (‘The REAL ID Act of 2005 places an additional burden 
on Zetino to demonstrate that one of the five protected grounds will be at least one central 
reason for his persecution’); Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1021 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(applying pre-REAL ID Act standard). 
42 Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004) (Serb petitioners suffered past 
persecution because Croat military specifically targeted their town for bombing, invasion, 
occupation and ethnic cleansing). 
43 Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that IJ’s suggestion 
‘that the violence directed against one individual is somehow less “on account of” his race 
because many other individuals of his ethnic group are also being targeted on account of 
their race” was illogical and had no support in case law’); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 
1194-95 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (‘[E]ven though generalized violence as a result of civil strife 
does not necessarily qualify as persecution, neither does civil strife eliminate the possibility of 
persecution’). 
44 Ndom, 384 F.3d at 753 (armed conflict between Senegalese forces and secessionist rebels); 
Hoque v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (widespread political violence 
in Bangladesh ‘says very little about’ whether applicant could demonstrate a persecutory 
motive).
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Persecution on account of religion or political opinion
Even when present, it is often difficult in gang-based asylum claims to 
demonstrate that an individual was targeted on account of their religious45 or 
political affiliations.46 For example, asylum applicants persecuted by non-State 
actors including guerrillas and organised criminal groups, must demonstrate 
that their targeting was specifically due to a publicly declared political opinion, 
rather than because they refused to join the group – even when the political 
stances are self-evident.47 
From the viewpoint of the United States or other countries, persecution 
that occurs within the context of a civil war, an insurgency, or the sphere of 
organised crime may appear too general, even when clearly delineated for 
those who actually experience it. Asylum applicants and attorneys alike can 
find it difficult to counter this perspective held by ‘outsider’ countries, since 
it may seem reasonable on the surface. If affirmative statements from the 
persecutor clearly identifying a protected ground as the reason for persecution, 
and an asylum applicant who is able to distinctly and credibly articulate these 
assertions, it is particularly difficult to demonstrate that an individual was 
targeted specifically due to his/her religious or political belief.48 Without the 
ability to make these sorts of assertions, those who fear gang-based persecution 
45 Tecun-Florian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (past torture by Guatemalan 
guerillas had no nexus to applicant’s religious beliefs).
46 Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding petitioner failed to 
establish persecution on account of political opinion where his ‘only act in opposition to 
organized crime was informing the police after his arrest about two individuals who had 
engaged in criminal activities’).
47 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 US 478, 481-82 (1992) (refusing to join guerrilla military 
was not evident on grounds of political persecution, and could have been for economic 
or family reasons). See also Tecun-Florian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Guatemalan not eligible when guerillas tortured him because he refused to join them); 
Sebastian-Sebastian v. INS, 195 F.3d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1999) (Guatemalan not eligible due 
to failure to show that guerillas beat and threatened him on account of imputed political 
opinion rather than for refusal to join them); Del Carmen Molina v. INS, 170 F.3d 1247, 
1249 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting petition where substantial evidence did not support BIA’s 
determination that Salvadoran guerillas’ threats were merely recruitment attempts); Molina-
Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2002) (no evidence to compel finding that 
Guatemalan guerillas attacked petitioner’s family on account of actual or imputed political 
opinion); Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (rape and murder 
of aunt by government politician in El Salvador was personal dispute); Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 
224 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (kidnapping by Guatemalan government soldiers and 
guerillas was not on account of political opinion, race or social group); Rivera-Moreno v. 
INS, 213 F.3d 481, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (no nexus between bombing of home and refusal to 
join guerillas); Bolshakov v. INS, 133 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1998) (criminal extortion 
and robbery in Russia).
48 Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting petitioner’s contention 
that he was persecuted on account of his political opinion based on his refusal to join a 
gang); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) (petitioner’s refusal to join 
gang did not prove persecution on account of a protected ground); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 
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must pursue protection through the most difficult and controversial ‘on 
account of ’ category in refugee and asylum law – membership of a particular 
social group.
Persecution on account of membership in a particular social 
group
On 7 February 2014, the BIA issued two precedent decisions on gang-based 
asylum which clarified how a person might demonstrate persecution on 
account of being a member of a particular social group.49 These decisions have 
thrown into flux both the approach that should be taken when putting forth 
an asylum claim pursuant to this theory, and the possibility of cases being 
reopened for applicants who had previously been denied asylum. 
The first decision, Matter of M-E-V-G-, clarified the ‘social visibility’ element 
of ‘particular social group’ developed under BIA precedent.50 It affirmed that 
in order to establish a ‘cognizable “particular social group”’, literal (‘ocular’) 
visibility is not required, and the actual analysis should centre on whether a 
group has ‘social distinction’, or is perceived by society as a specific group. The 
BIA acknowledged that establishing a ‘particular social group’ is difficult and 
put forth three criteria for establishing the existence for purposes of asylum 
law, including whether it is: ‘1) composed of members who share a common 
immutable characteristic; 2) defined with particularity; and 3) socially distinct 
within the society in question’.51 
Although the BIA declined to make a ruling on whether Honduran youths 
who were actively recruited and refused to join a gang constituted a particular 
social group because further fact-finding was required, it clarified that there is 
no ‘blanket rejection of all factual scenarios involving gangs’ and that ‘[s]ocial 
group determinations are made on a case-by-case basis’.52 This was a substantial 
finding as it directly confronted an earlier BIA precedent decision holding that 
neither Salvadoran youth who had been subjected to recruitment efforts and 
had rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on their own personal, 
moral and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities, nor the family 
members of such youth constituted a ‘particular social group’.53
542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (alien’s general aversion to gangs did not constitute a 
political opinion for asylum purposes).
49 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (2014) and Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
227 (2014).
50 Not based on international law, the BIA created this element of social group in a 2008 case. 
See Matter of S-E-G-, et al. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008).
51 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec., p. 227.
52 Ibid., p. 251.
53 Matter of S-E-G-, et al., 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008).
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The second decision, Matter of W-G-R-, reiterated much of the above, but 
declined to extend asylum protection, finding that the respondent had failed 
to establish both that ‘former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador 
who have renounced their gang membership’ constitute a ‘particular social 
group’, and that a nexus existed between his status as a former gang member 
and his fear of harm. According to the BIA, the record contained ‘documentary 
evidence describing gangs, gang violence, and the treatment of gang members 
but very little documentation discussing the treatment or status of former gang 
members’.54 The ‘scant evidence’ was insufficient to meet the social distinction 
requirement.55
In light of these decisions, in May 2014, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case 
of an indigenous Guatemalan man who was recruited but refused to join the 
Mara Salvatrucha.56 In a published case the court applied the standards as set 
forth in the BIA’s February decisions (and its own earlier decision, Henriquez-
Rivas),57 and reversed the BIA’s judgment, holding that an immigration 
judge had correctly ‘found that in openly opposing the Mara Salvatrucha in 
Guatemala, Pirir-Boc ’allied himself with a particular social group of persons 
directly in opposition to gang activities’.58 
Pursuant to the BIA’s new language of ‘social distinction’, an applicant for 
asylum should be able to demonstrate the presence of a social group through 
the provisions that have been enacted to specifically protect youth from gang 
recruitment, and victims of organised crime. For example, in 2013, Mexico 
enacted a General Law of Victims, which legally recognises victims of human 
rights violations as a unique group with specific vulnerabilities and the right 
to protection and reparations.59 This year, five cases of victimisation due to 
internal displacement by organised crime were opened by the Commissioners 
of the Victims Law. Similarly, the Organization of American States has initiated 
a project to strengthen institutions that specialise in assistance and protection 
to victims of organised crime.60 And, in 2006, USAID recognised the need to 
support programmes for victims and ex-gang members in Mexico and Central 
54 Ibid. 
55 The finding in this decision was based on a sparse record, as articulated by the BIA, and 
should not preclude a different finding in a better documented case. 
56 Pirir Boc v. Holder, no. 09-73671 (9th Cir. 7 May 2014).
57 Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (2013). This decision came after cases 
before the Third and Seventh Circuits invalidated W-G-R-/M-EV-G as inconsistent with 
prior BIA precedent. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of US, 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3rd 
Cir.2011); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.2009).
58 Pirir-Boc v. Holder, p. 6.
59 L. Villagran, ‘“We are millions”: victims of organized crime in Mexico seek justice in new 
law,’ The Christian Science Monitor, 11 Jan. 2013. 
60 Organización de los Estados Americanos, ‘Concluye taller de la OEA en Guatemala sobre 
asistencia y protección a víctimas de crimen organizado’, 12 Aug. 2015, available at www.
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America.61 The recognition, through these programmes, of those vulnerable 
to recruitment as well as those who have been victims of gang violence 
demonstrates that local society does in fact deem these groups to be socially 
distinct in Mexico and the Northern Triangle.
What happens now?
Currently, the Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts have explicitly found 
that blanket conclusions on whether an individual is part of a social group 
qualifying for protection under US asylum law is not appropriate, and that an 
analysis of ‘social distinction’ rather than ‘social visibility’ is necessary, although 
it must be said the difference between these two standards needs to be better 
articulated.62 In line with these decisions, the BIA has now issued two decisions 
reinforcing these findings. 
However, ten other Circuit Courts have yet to issue decisions since the BIA’s 
2014 findings were published, all of which have followed the BIA’s earlier and 
extremely restrictive interpretation of a ‘particular social group.’ This includes 
the Fifth Circuit, which along with the Ninth Circuit holds the vast majority 
of detained asylum-seekers and which, because it includes Texas, also receives 
the vast majority of Central Americans and Mexicans who make gang-based 
asylum claims. The Fifth Circuit takes a particularly conservative approach 
to immigration relief, and in 2012 denied 95 per cent of asylum claims, 
whether based on a need for protection, a family relationship or a waiver of 
removability.63 
Even with these more positive decisions from the BIA and three Circuit 
Courts, it will likely remain exceptionally hard for individuals from Mexico 
and the Northern Triangle to be granted asylum, but this is no reason to give 
up. The Refugee Convention contemplated protection for those individuals 
fleeing persecution for many reasons, and some gang-based persecution claims, 
fairly adjudicated individually and in a non-discriminatory manner, will merit 
protection. Meanwhile, it is incumbent on advocates and academics to monitor 
the processing of claims, identify instances and patterns of discrimination, and 
challenge the US to fulfil its obligations to refugees from Mexico and Central 
America, regardless of their proximity.
oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-337/14 (accessed 15 March 
2016).
61 ‘Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment’, USAID Bureau for Latin America and the 
Caribbean Office of Regional Sustainable Development, April 2006.
62 ‘Particular social group practice advisory: applying for asylum matter of M-E-V-G- and 
matter of W-G-R’, The National Immigrant Justice Center, Feb. 2014, p. 4.
63 A. Estevez, ‘The biopolitics of asylum law in Texas’, North America: Immigration and 
Immigration Policy in the US Today, 8 (2013), 66−7. 
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Withholding of removal and the Convention against 
Torture 
In the US, individuals may simultaneously pursue ‘Withholding of Removal’ 
(withholding) and protection under the Convention against Torture (CAT) 
when they file their asylum applications under the terms of the Refugee 
Convention.64 Withholding codifies the international norm of non-refoulement 
or non-return to a country where an applicant would face persecution or other 
serious violations of human rights.65 As with asylum, a withholding application 
must be based on fear of persecution on account of a protected ground. A 
person must also demonstrate the higher standard that they are ‘more likely 
than not’ to face persecution if returned to their country of origin or last 
habitual residence.66 
An applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum 
necessarily does not meet the more stringent standard for withholding.67 
However, if asylum is denied in the exercise of discretion, the applicant 
remains eligible for withholding, and it is mandatory if the legal elements 
are satisfied.68 Article 3 of the CAT absolutely prohibits states from returning 
anyone to another state where he or she may be tortured.69 The United States 
signed the CAT on 18 April 1988, and Congress passed the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA) in 1988 to implement Article 3 of 
the Convention.70 
There are two forms of protection pursuant to CAT: 1) withholding of 
removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) for individuals who are not barred from 
64 An application for asylum pursuant to 8 USC. § 1158 is generally considered an application 
for withholding of removal under 8 USC. § 1231(b)(3), (INA § 241(b)(3)), and an 
application for Convention Against Torture protection under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(1).
65 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US 415, 427 (1999) (‘The basic withholding provision … 
parallels Article 33 [of the Refugee Convention], which provides that no Contracting 
State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of [a protected 
ground]’) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
66 Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also INS v. Stevic, 467 US 407, 430 (1984); Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Hanna v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2007); Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 
F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).
67 Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Zehatye, 453 F.3d at 1190. 
68 Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 95 (9th Cir. 2006); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1032 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
69 Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (‘Article 3 provides that a signatory 
nation will not expel, return … or extradite a person to another country where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), amended by 355 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). 
70 Pub. L. no. 105-277, Div. G, Title XXII, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (codified as Note to 8 USC. 
§ 1231). 
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eligibility for having been convicted of a ’particularly serious crime’ or of an 
aggravated felony for which the term of imprisonment is at least five years; and 
2) deferral of removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) for individuals entitled to 
protection but subject to mandatory denial of withholding.71 
Although the forms of relief available through both withholding and CAT 
are extremely relevant to the discussion of claims arising out of persecution 
by organised criminal groups, gangs and other armed actors, the brevity of 
this chapter does not permit an in-depth look at the statutory, regulatory 
and jurisprudence that has taken shape. These forms of protection have been 
extended to both the victims of persecution, and to those victimised after 
leaving gangs who were found ineligible for asylum due to their previous gang 
activities.72
The principle of non-discrimination and reality
Neither international law nor US law permits discrimination in the application 
of the Refugee Convention or asylum law but, historically and currently, 
Mexicans and Central Americans face heightened scrutiny in their applications 
for protection.73 Discrimination in the adjudication of asylum applications 
from Central America was successfully challenged in the early 1990s, and there 
is no reason why it could not be challenged again.
As a result of the civil wars raging in El Salvador and Guatemala in the 
early 1980s, thousands of their citizens began seeking protection in the US. 
These asylum-seekers reported widespread repression targeted at indigenous 
communities and broad segments of society, including teachers, students, trade 
unionists, peasants who supported cooperatives, relatives of people supporting 
the opposition, and Catholics working in lay Christian communities. Their 
testimony was amply supported by credible human rights reports, which 
documented the massacring of families and villages, the pervasive use of torture 
and extra-judicial killings.74 
Rather than take up their asylum claims, the US detained these asylum- 
seekers and used coercive tactics, such as intimidation, to encourage voluntary 
71 The United States Department of Justice (4 Feb. 2015) ‘Asylum, withholding of removal, 
CAT’ (Immigration Judge Benchbook), available at www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-
judge-benchbook-section-241b (accessed 15 March 2016).
72 R. Germain, ‘AILA’s Asylum Primer’, American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA, 3rd 
edn., 2003), pp. 72−3.
73 M. Turck, ‘Border patrol unlawfully deporting potential asylum seekers’, Al Jazeera, 21 Nov. 
2014.
74 Amnesty International (15 March 2013) ‘El Salvador: no justice 20 years on from UN 
Truth Commission’, available at www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2013/03/el-salvador-no-
justice-years-un-truth-commission/ (accessed 15 March 2016). 
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return to their countries of origin.75 Those who pursued protection were almost 
always denied. At the administrative level, less than three per cent of Salvadoran 
claims were granted asylum, and one per cent or less of Guatemalans received 
asylum.76 These figures compared with asylum grant rates for all nationalities 
of approximately 30 per cent and considerably higher for some nationalities. 
Responding to the utter disregard for these communities and their rights, a 
‘sanctuary’ movement arose out of US churches and refugee communities, and 
some of the former affirmatively declared that they would provide refuge to 
these individuals regardless of law. Despite crackdowns on participants by the 
US Department of Justice, by the mid 1980s, over 300 churches and synagogues 
had declared ‘public sanctuary’. In 1985, churches joined with legal counsel 
to file a historic class action challenging the US to uphold its obligations to 
refugees from Guatemala and Central America. American Baptist Churches et al. 
v. Thornburgh was filed in May 1985 on behalf of over 80 religious and refugee 
organisations, and refugee legal assistance groups.77 The lawsuit alleged that the 
discriminatory adjudication of their requests for asylum and withholding of 
deportation violated the US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. 
After three years, the Supreme Court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on 
the claims regarding discriminatory treatment of Central American asylum-
seekers. Citing the low approval rate for asylum applicants from El Salvador 
and Guatemala, despite the overwhelming evidence that persecution and 
torture was rife in their home countries, the Court ruled that each individual 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan would not be required to go through the 
administrative determination of his or her case before the Court could examine 
the pattern and practice of violations alleged by the plaintiffs.
In 1991, after six years of litigation, the US government settled the case 
with the plaintiffs, acknowledging in the settlement that discrimination based 
on nationality was improper. Further, it recognised that foreign policy and 
border enforcement considerations, the US government’s views of the asylum 
applicant’s political or ideological beliefs, and the fact the individual has arrived 
from a country supported politically by the US were not acceptable factors in 
determining statutory eligibility for asylum. Most importantly, the settlement 
provided all denied asylum applicants with the right to file a new request for 
protection.78 
75 L. Chavez and S. Riordan, ‘Disappeared and departed’, American Civil Liberties Union, 4 
June 2013. 
76 S. Gammage, ‘El Salvador: despite end to civil war, emigration continues’, Migration Policy 
Institute, 26 July 2007. 
77 American Baptist Church v. Thornburgh, 760F. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
78 T. Realmuto, ‘ABC v. Thornburgh: 20 years later’, National Immigration Project of the 
National Lawyers Guild, 31 Jan. 2011. 
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This stunning result should not be viewed as an anomaly. The circumstances 
facing refugees from Central America in the 1980s mirror both the current 
experiences of Mexican and Central Americans in their countries of origin, and 
their ability to achieve protection in the US now. Like then, it is most likely 
that discrimination based on nationality is playing a role in the evaluation of 
gang-based claims now, even if not explicit. Challenging decisions, however, 
will require an exceptional investment in strategic litigation and joint advocacy 
before the administration and federal courts. There is no reason to believe it 
could not ultimately be successful. 
Conclusion
By the mid 2000s, gang-based asylum claims were not an anomaly in certain 
parts of the US, but their regularity of occurrence has not resulted in a pattern 
of predictable jurisprudence upon which advocates, attorneys or asylum-seekers 
themselves can rely. In fact, when a person may benefit from asylum and related 
protection in these circumstances remains greatly in flux. Out of 13 Circuit 
Courts, ten have followed the BIA’s former precedent decisions on gang-based 
asylum, narrowly construing the availability of protection. Yet, in February 
2014, the BIA issued two new decisions clarifying its earlier analysis,79 and in 
May 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently published 
a favourable decision referring directly to these new resolutions.80 How these 
new determinations will be applied and what it means for those persecuted by 
organised criminal groups remains an open question.
Meanwhile, border patrol agents who make the first decision to refer people 
to be considered for entry into the US, and asylum officers who conduct 
reasonable and credible ‘fear interviews’ should be aware of the growing 
body of evidence supporting the assertion that organised criminal groups are 
persecuting individuals and families throughout Mexico and the Northern 
Triangle, and that their governments are unwilling or unable to protect them. 
Each individual and family presenting themselves at the border should be 
treated as a unique case, and no application should be assumed to be far-
fetched by reason of the individual’s origin. There is no reason to believe that 
the persecution and torture of Mexicans and Central Americans will stop any 
time in the near future, and the US has an obligation to provide those who fear 
serious human rights violations with protection. 
79 Matter of W-G-R, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (2014), Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 
(2014). 
80 Pirir Boc v. Holder, no. 09-73671 (9th Cir. 2014).
